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Abstract
Introduction For better or worse, the imposition of work-hour
limitations on house-staff has imperiled continuity and/or
improved decision-making. Regardless, the workflow of every
physician team in every academic medical centre has been
irrevocably altered. We explored the use of cognitive task
analysis (CTA) techniques, most commonly used in other high-
stress and time-sensitive environments, to analyse key cognitive
activities in critical care medicine. The study objective was to
assess the usefulness of CTA as an analytical tool in order that
physician cognitive tasks may be understood and redistributed
within the work-hour limited medical decision-making teams.
Methods After approval from each Institutional Review Board,
two intensive care units (ICUs) within major university teaching
hospitals served as data collection sites for CTA observations
and interviews of critical care providers.
Results Five broad categories of cognitive activities were
identified: pattern recognition; uncertainty management;
strategic vs. tactical thinking; team coordination and
maintenance of common ground; and creation and transfer of
meaning through stories.
Conclusions CTA within the framework of Naturalistic Decision
Making is a useful tool to understand the critical care process of
decision-making and communication. The separation of
strategic and tactical thinking has implications for workflow
redesign. Given the global push for work-hour limitations, such
workflow redesign is occurring. Further work with CTA
techniques will provide important insights toward rational, rather
than random, workflow changes.
Introduction
Physician care provided for hospitalised patients has under-
gone a dramatic change over the past decade. As one exam-
ple, the imposition of work-hour limitations on house-staff is
believed to be either good [1] or bad [2] and has either imper-
iled continuity [3] or improved decision-making [4]. Regard-
less, the structure and function of every physician team in
every academic medical centre has been irrevocably altered.
Whether the changes are good or bad is not, however, the
appropriate first question. First, there must be an explicit and
complete delineation of the goals of the physician team and
the necessary requisite tasks performed to meet those goals.
For example, the conceptual goal of a critical care unit-based
physician team is to bring 16 patients back to their baseline
health as quickly and as safely as is possible. Obviously, spe-
cific operational goals (e.g. endotracheal extubation, full calo-
rie delivery) must be set. Tasks this team must perform include
cognitive tasks (e.g. triaging admissions and deciding whether
a white cell count of 24,000 × 109/L with a 38.4°C tempera-
ture warrants antibiotics). Tasks also include procedural tasks
such as endotracheal intubation and central line placement. A
subset of procedural tasks is administrative (e.g. prescribing
orders, documentation, scheduling imaging studies).
CDM: Critical Decision Method; CTA: Cognitive Task Analysis; ICU: intensive care unit; NDM: Naturalistic Decision Making.Critical Care    Vol 13 No 2    Fackler et al.
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Sporadic efforts have been made to redistribute some physi-
cian tasks. For example, many academic medical centres have
created teams to place intravenous catheters. Yet, a compre-
hensive task analysis has not been performed for physician
teams.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether the tech-
niques of cognitive task analysis (CTA) (see Table 1 for defini-
tion) guided by the theoretical framework of naturalistic
decision-making (NDM) (Table 1) can be used to begin the
comprehensive physician-team task analysis to guide physi-
cian-team restructuring and/or task reallocation.
Materials and methods
Participants
After approval from each Institutional Review Board, two inten-
sive care units (ICUs) within major university teaching hospi-
tals served as data collection sites. Consent was waived given
the work used interview procedures and observation of public
behavior and no data were personally identifiable. One of the
ICUs is a 20-bed medical ICU. The medical team is typically a
critical care attending, a fellow, nurse practitioners and rotat-
ing internal medicine residents. The second ICU is a 14-bed
unit that generally cares for surgical oncology patients. It is
staffed by a critical care attending, a fellow, nurse practitioners
and rotating anaesthesia and surgical residents. Both teams
are supported by a clinical pharmacist. Neither ICU has in-
house attending coverage 24 hours a day seven days a week,
although the second ICU has 24-hour in-house fellow cover-
age.
Between the two hospitals, we interviewed 14 members of
these medical teams and six bedside nurses who were either
rostered to provide clinical care at the time of the study or
were physically in the ICU for another reason. The participants
included: seven attending physicians, three fellows, two resi-
dents, one clinical pharmacist and one nurse practitioner.
Observational data were collected over two days in each unit,
beginning with morning rounds. The observers were afforded
extensive access to the units and their staffs, and all health
care providers on the ICU.
Data collection
A four-person research team carried out the CTA [5] inter-
views and conducted the ICU observations on two consecu-
tive days at each site. No research team member had special
medical training. For this initial work, data collection was
focused on three topic areas (chosen by consensus of the
authors): cognitive processes and decision-making; technol-
ogy use; and team issues. Investigation of cognitive processes
included exploration of decision-making, uncertainty manage-
ment, attention management, sensemaking, problem detec-
tion, leverage points, planning/replanning and use of mental
simulation. Questions about technology centred on how ICU
personnel used available information technologies. Questions
regarding the health care team focused on roles and functions,
information management and communication of common
ground (information sharing).
Observations
Researchers spent 70 man-hours observing rounds and inter-
actions among the ICU staff. In one hospital, morning rounds
were conducted in parallel by two attending physicians work-
ing with two separate teams; pairs of researchers observed
each team. The other hospital used one ICU rounding team.
On day one, all four members of the research team observed
rounds. On day two, observations were conducted by two
researchers, while the other researchers conducted inter-
views. Depending on patient complexity, rounds lasted
between 10 and 60 minutes per patient. Research observers
were intentionally unobtrusive and shadowed the rounding
team standing on the edge of the group. Research observers
made notes but did not attempt to interact with unit staff dur-
ing this portion of data collection.
Given the exploratory nature of the project, the observational
data gathering was not highly structured. The research team
took an ethnographic approach (Table 1), observing and tak-
ing notes on the verbal exchanges, interactions and informa-
tion exchanged across the rounding team. Particular attention
was paid to information flow and the variety of patient data
sources (e.g. supporting technologies, patient charts, hand-
Table 1
Definitions of terms used in the study.
Term Definition
Cognitive Task Analysis A family of methods for gaining access to the cognitive processes that underlie performance 
of tasks, and the cognitive skills needed to respond adeptly to complex situations.
Naturalistic Decision Making (paradigm) The scientific study of decision-making in complex, natural environments.
Dyad Aa two-person team.
Ethnography Use of qualitative research methods to provide a detailed, in-depth description of everyday 
life and practice. The ethnographic approach has its roots in cultural anthropology.
These definitions are crucial to understanding the methods and findings.Available online http://ccforum.com/content/13/2/R33
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written notes, reference guides and forms, diagnostic data)
accessed by the team and referred to during case presenta-
tion. Notes were taken of the questions posed, responses
given, requests for data and by whom. The result was a richly
detailed record of the rounding team's interactions, informa-
tion searches, and problem solving and diagnostic processes.
Immediately following our observations, the research team met
briefly to identify events that occurred during rounds for follow-
up in subsequent interviews. This allowed better linkage
between observational and interview data.
Interviews were conducted with 14 ICU staff for between 1.5
and 2 hours; most were physicians as physician decision-mak-
ing was the study focus. Interviews were conducted using an
adaptation of the Critical Decision Method (CDM) of knowl-
edge elicitation [6,7]. The CDM is a CTA technique that relies
on recollection of a specific incident as its starting point. It
employs a semi-structured interview format with specific,
focused probes to elicit particular types of information from the
interviewee. For the purposes of this study, the CDM interview
was adapted to allow in-depth exploration of events and slices
of incidents observed on the unit during rounds [8].
Interviewers made a rough sketch of the rounding team,
including team members, their position within the group and
any information technologies we had observed in use. The
interviewee was asked to describe the roles and functions of
each team member, and to identify what information they get
from each person and what information they give to each team
member.
Next, a decision, assessment or other event was identified for
the interviewee, in which he/she had been an active partici-
pant. The interviewee was asked to recount the event from
their own perspective and a series of cognitive queries, or
probes, were posed about the event. Probes were aimed at
aspects of uncertainty management, attention management,
sensemaking, problem detection, leverage points, planning/
replanning and mental simulation.
In addition to the 14 in-depth interviews, three abbreviated
interviews were conducted on the unit with on-duty ICU staff.
These individuals were selected because of their availability at
the time, although the amount of time they had available was
limited. They provided important insights into a number of top-
ics such as shift hand-overs, technology, information flow and
physician-nurse communication. Finally, additional in-depth
interviews were conducted with three intensivists affiliated
with different ICUs in the two hospitals. These interviews pro-
vided insights into issues such as how training is currently car-
ried out and how senior physicians use technology during
patient care.
Data analysis
Notes from the 14 in-depth interviews were expanded into text
files, and checked for accuracy against the original data
records of each interviewer.
A preliminary review was made through the full set of observa-
tional notes and interview data to identify a comprehensive set
of variables and content categories for inclusion in a more sys-
tematic examination. A thematic analysis was then conducted
to identify major themes and descriptive categories. The anal-
ysis yielded 16 thematic topics. Using category formulation
and sorting techniques for data reduction and structuring of
the thematic data [9], a smaller set of key categories was iden-
tified; these comprise the core findings of the study.
Results
Five key categories of cognitive activities were identified in the
data analysis.
Pattern recognition
Pattern recognition is a key aspect of critical care expertise
and a principal area in which less-experienced physicians
need further skill development. Members of the ICU team were
observed frequently using the term 'pattern', so patterns is a
well-recognised construct. However, when asked to describe
what was meant by patterns and to give examples, no clear,
consistent definition emerged.
We observed pattern recognition in two forms. One pattern
was of a complete 'template' or mental model [10,11]. Asthma
is one such complete template based on a minimal history,
appearance and breath sounds. A typical asthma mental
model includes the constellation of cues of a patient who is in
an upright position, sweaty, speaking in one word answers,
exhibiting labored breathing and attentive to his or her own
breathing. However, such 'classic' complete mental models
are uncommon.
The second but distinct cognitive task is the real-time merging
of pattern fragments (also called 'packets') into unique (patient
specific) mental models. Observed more frequently than iden-
tifying the complete template, these packets are recognised
as cues that are postulated to be related. It is only through a
flexible and dynamic integration of these packets that a com-
plete (or partial) mental model can be created. These mental
models are highly context specific. The cue of blood pressure
of 80/40 mmHg is quite different in a patient with respiratory
failure than in a patient with congestive heart failure, chronic
hypertension and high serum troponins.
Strategic versus tactical thinking
Both strategic thinking (long term, often multi-patient, goal ori-
ented) and tactical thinking (short term, single patient, detail
and task oriented) were observed. Particularly in the minds of
junior housestaff, strategic thinking was not routine. The focusCritical Care    Vol 13 No 2    Fackler et al.
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of their activities tended to be much more tactical as they were
immersed in the details of testing and treating the patient and
coordinating with members of the staff to get a specific treat-
ment plan delivered. Junior housestaff were occasionally
observed struggling when required by the attending physician
to transition from tactical to strategic-level thinking. For exam-
ple, an attending physician expressed displeasure with an
intern when learning a tracheostomy the patient was sup-
posed to receive had been postponed by several days. The
attending physician was thinking at the strategic level (toward
the goal of ICU discharge), while the intern was thinking tacti-
cally (substituting an imaging study as it was also on his task
list).
Uncertainty management
Substantial evidence documented uncertainty (from various
sources) as a defining feature of critical care medicine. Mem-
bers of the critical care team may be uncertain, for example,
about a patient's missing or erroneous laboratory values. They
may be uncertain if a patient's symptoms do not fit a complete
pattern or about the underlying cause of a patient's illness.
One ICU team was grappling with uncertainty surrounding the
declining cognitive functioning of a patient. They asked ques-
tions such as, "Why is she continuing to experience
decreased cognitive functioning? Is she still sedated, and if so,
why are the drugs still in her system? Are there other areas of
infection we are missing? What haven't we tested for?" Uncer-
tainty permeates all aspects of critical care medicine.
Creation and transfer of meaning through stories
A critical cognitive task within strategic thinking appears to be
the creation and use of stories. The term 'story' was used
explicitly during rounds as an attending asked the intern or res-
ident, "what's the patient's story?". Reference was also made
to the patient's 'picture'. Despite differences in terminology,
the observational and interview data suggest a common cog-
nitive activity. In both settings, health care teams were devel-
oping a framework of causal connections and a central theme
that tied the various packets of patient data (medical history,
test results, etc.) together in a meaningful way. These stories
appear to provide the critical care team with an organising
mechanism to make decisions about patient care and treat-
ment. Story creation served to create a mental model as a
diagnostic tool, to generate expectations and predictions
about a patient's trajectory of illness and a way to catch incon-
sistencies.
There appear to be two key components of stories in the ICU.
Firstly, there is story building: activities involved in constructing
meaning and creating the story as a means of understanding
the patient (i.e. the coalescing of partial templates into a men-
tal model). Secondly, there is story telling: activities involved in
sharing the story as a means of communicating and maintain-
ing a common mental model within the health care team.
These two processes appear to occur in real time, sometimes
in an emergent fashion. The mental model, or story, of the
patient is created and communicated in the moment, during
rounds where different members of the ICU team contribute
unique template fragments.
The observations showed story creation and story sharing are
skills. As with any skill, it is developed through experience. Dur-
ing rounds, interns and residents often presented a lengthy list
of problems the patient was facing and data they had at that
point, but seemed to have little sense of how to tie the informa-
tion together into a coherent mental model.
An additional finding that emerged from the interviews is that
the complete story is not captured fully in any one place and,
often, not by any one caregiver; rather it emerged over time.
Important elements of the story may be missing altogether
from the patient record or may be fragmented so that one por-
tion is captured in nursing notes, another in the patients' elec-
tronic chart and another in a paper-based consultant's note.
Moreover, the overall picture, and its supportive data, may not
be adequately communicated during shift hand-overs or
between members of the health care team. There was evi-
dence suggesting that shift hand-overs often involve a series
of checklists, and it is questionable whether or not the
essence of the story is captured in these exchanges. When
asked about the consequences of losing parts of the picture/
story, physicians and nurses readily acknowledged there are
negative consequences for decision-making and quality of
patient care.
Team coordination
It was clear in the observations that the two ICU environments
studied were characterized by collaboration, where cognitive
work and expertise are distributed among members of a multi-
disciplinary team that includes nurses, physicians, respiratory
therapists, pharmacists, and other professionals.
Team communication
During the interviews, one of the themes that emerged was the
presence of communication difficulties between nurses and
physicians. Communication problems between nurses and
physicians are complicated, in part, because physicians and
nurses believe they speak different languages. Nurses inter-
viewed explained that nurses and physicians use different ter-
minology to refer to patient needs. Their distinct professional
backgrounds and training lead to different ways of seeing the
world, different concerns and different goals.
Fragmentary teams
Another complicating factor observed that can impede a com-
mon understanding (often called common ground) in the ICU
team relates to the sub-teams or smaller dyads (Table 1) that
communicate and make important assessments and decisions
about patient care throughout the course of the day. Frag-Available online http://ccforum.com/content/13/2/R33
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ments of the larger ICU team – the nurse with the intern, the
intern with the pharmacist, etc – were observed engaging in
important conversations, during and outside of rounds. In
some of these cases, notes from the conversations were
recorded. In others, they were not. In some cases these
smaller teams were discussing specific tests and specific
pieces of data, but were not aggregating it with other data to
see the bigger picture. Fractured teams were observed during
rounds when team members were interrupted by phone calls,
visiting consultants or other ICU issues.
Shifting teams
Challenges in coordinating and maintaining common ground
in the ICU were also found to stem from the unstable and shift-
ing nature of the teams. ICU teams perceive their performance
to be negatively impacted by the fact that they change every
two to four weeks as residents and attendings rotate in and
out.
Increasing numbers of shift hand-overs
Clinicians interviewed indicated that in many shift hand-overs,
important information is not communicated. Critical aspects of
the patient picture or story can slip through the cracks, hinder-
ing the team's ability to make sense of the patient's condition
and to make vital decisions about treatment and care.
Role ambiguity in the ICU
Confusion surrounding roles and functions in the critical care
team were uncovered. These confusions were particularly pro-
nounced surrounding where a nurse's role ends and a physi-
cian's role begins. A relatively common sentiment among the
nurses was captured in one nurse interview. She explained
that sometimes she is asked to use her own discretion regard-
ing certain decisions such as sedation. But when she does
use her discretion, the physicians then tell her not to give the
patient any more sedatives. As a result, she is frequently
unsure about what to do and she questions whether certain
decisions are truly at her discretion.
External collaborators in critical care
During the data collection, difficulties were observed resulting
from coordination problems between members of the ICU
team and the consultants. It was clear from the observations in
both ICUs that the critical care team plays a pivotal role within
the context of the larger organisation. A host of challenges
arise when members of the ICU team must coordinate patient
care and maintain common ground with other members of the
larger multi-disciplinary team.
Discussion
In this exploratory study, CTA tools were applied to identify
cognitive aspects of critical care practice in two academic
ICUs. CTA is a tool within the theoretical perspective of NDM.
Several cognitive activities that members of the critical care
team engage in, as part of their decision-making process, were
identified including pattern recognition, uncertainty manage-
ment, strategic vs. tactical thinking, team coordination, crea-
tion and transfer of meaning through stories, and maintenance
of common ground.
Researchers using the NDM framework have examined expert
performance with a wide variety of professionals such as fire-
fighters [12], weapons directors [13], anti-air warfare com-
mand and control officers [14], pilots [15], electronic warfare
officers [16] and critical care nurses [17]. By studying the cog-
nitive aspects of expert performance in these domains, NDM
researchers have been able to make recommendations on
how to improve training and system support to facilitate per-
formance of both experts and non-experts.
CTA comprises a series of techniques for knowledge elicita-
tion and knowledge representation ranging from the CDM
[7,8,17,18] to the Knowledge Audit [19] to a variety of team
CTA techniques [20]. The tools allow an understanding of the
cognitive aspects of the expert's behaviour; in particular the
judgment, decision-making and problem-solving skills that are
so critical in the time-pressured, uncertain and ever-changing
environment of the ICU.
These data are neither the first use of cognitive psychology
techniques nor cognitive task analysis in particular, within the
domain of critical care. Cohen and colleagues used the theo-
retical framework of distributed cognition (also used exten-
sively in aviation and the military) to examine cognitive errors in
a busy psychiatric emergency department [21]. They discov-
ered a number of worrisome system problems associated with
cognitive tasks distributed across people, time, space and
technologies. One clear similarity between their findings and
our own is the concept of fragmentary (or 'mini') teams as
sources of cognitive dissidence and potential errors [21]. Oth-
ers have used observations and interviews to model emer-
gency room hand-over [22] and critical care workflow [23]. All
three studies focused on creating systems and technologies
to support current workflows. Again, working to support exist-
ing workflow, Ho and colleagues observed communication
and sense-making during critical care rounds [24]. Closest to
the intent of our work is a study by Renard and colleagues
where the tasks associated with medication prescribing were
analysed, simulated and postulated amenable to redesign
[25].
There are several key cognitive areas where this exploratory
work suggests deeper analysis will be fruitful and necessary.
Assistance with mental model creation
Pattern recognition is challenging because of the massive
quantities of data with which critical care practitioners are
faced. Within a sea of data, it can be extremely challenging to
pick up a 'signature' or a pattern. For pattern recognition to be
enhanced, better delineation of templates within critical careCritical Care    Vol 13 No 2    Fackler et al.
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need to be identified with their essential data elements, and
these templates must be explicitly taught to trainees. Rather
counterintuitively, the actual number of data elements may be
rather small [26,27]. Only after consistent patterns are discov-
ered can their use by the physicians and nurses be studied.
A robust notion of mental models, that takes into consideration
causal connections and the meaning of those connections in
a given context, is a concept called fragmentary mental models
[28]. Fragmentary mental models are packets of local cause/
effect connections that permit people to connect smaller
pieces into a bigger picture. Fragmentary mental models are
put together as the situation warrants to construct a compre-
hensive just-in-time mental model of the situation – one that is
flexible, dynamic (changing over time) and context-specific
[28,29]. Experts have a richer and broader repertoire of frag-
mentary mental models than novices, helping them to draw
inferences and to make sense of situations.
Supporting shifts between, or separation of, strategic 
and tactical thinking
Both tactical and strategic thinking are central to critical care
medicine. Strategic thinking enables the practitioner to con-
sider the big picture (single patient, multi-patient and/or multi-
unit), recognise patterns and trends, set priorities and con-
sider alternatives. In a traditional academic setting strategic
thinking is generally the responsibility of the attending position
and tactical thinking (e.g. running the tests, assessing labora-
tory values and coordinating with other members of the team)
is the responsibility of the housestaff. Being able to transition
between tactical and strategic thinking is central to effective
critical care medicine as it is currently practiced; yet this is no
simple task. Most of the training of residents is focused on tac-
tical thinking. As a result of not operating at the strategic level,
it can be difficult for housestaff to effectively prioritise tasks.
Supporting uncertainty management
It is often assumed that uncertainty stems from a lack of infor-
mation. If that were the case, the problem of uncertainty could
be solved by technological advancements that provide practi-
tioners with access to all possible data. Yet, uncertainty is, in
fact, a lot more complex than just missing information [30]. It
is often the complexity of the data and the difficulty in integrat-
ing the data that leads to uncertainty.
Although physicians may feel more confident in their decision-
making when they have more information available, evidence
suggests that decision-making performance actually declines
with too much data [26,30,31]. More data can simply confuse
the issues, making it difficult for physicians to integrate and/or
interpret it [26,31]. In addition, the overwhelming majority of
information is typically irrelevant to the immediate problem and
can get in the way of effective decision-making.
There are practical ramifications of uncertainty in the context
of the discussion of templates, patterns and mental models.
Appreciating uncertainty is crucial to avoid being locked into
an incomplete and, possibly, incorrect, mental model (a cogni-
tive error sometimes called 'premature closure').
Support creation and transfer of meaning through 
stories
Related to common ground is the use of stories in the ICU. In
many circumstances, important information is being lost in the
transition of care from shift to shift. Recent data suggests that
because housestaff work restricted work hours, shift hand-
over errors exceed the number of errors due to fatigue [32].
This finding suggests critical elements of the patient's story
are not being communicated. A broader understanding of sto-
ries in the ICU – including the function they serve, how they
are created and shared within the team, and how technology
can support those processes – may offer significant leverage
toward ameliorating this problem.
Assisting team coordination and common ground
Over the past 10 years, the health care domain has adopted
lessons that were learned from the aviation industry, incorpo-
rating crew resource management principles to address the
challenges of teamwork. A different way to think about the
cognitive challenges of teamwork is through the concept of
common ground [33]. In this exploratory study, some of the
barriers to common ground were identified that ICU teams
face such as role ambiguity, the shifting nature of the teams
and a higher number of shift hand-overs due to hour restric-
tions.
Redesigning shift hand-overs or rounds procedures may be a
way for ICU teams to enhance common ground [34-36]. A
central key to sustaining common ground in teams is to catch
discrepancies or possible erosions in common ground, and to
take preemptive action to avert a potentially disastrous break-
down [37,38]. Modified shift hand-over or rounding proce-
dures should elicit potential discrepancies before they
become entrenched. The procedures and technological sup-
port systems will most effectively support common ground if
they involve the following activities: first, including various clar-
ifications and reminders that can be used as a means of simply
validating an assumption or giving team members a chance to
challenge assumptions; second, updating others about
changes that occurred outside their view or when they were
otherwise engaged; third, monitoring the other team members
to gauge whether common ground is being seriously compro-
mised and is breaking down, along with actively encouraging
all clinical team members to contribute their knowledge;
fourth, detecting anomalies that signal a potential loss of com-
mon ground; and fifth, repairing the loss of common ground.
The study has several limitations. The study was, by design,
exploratory; more questions were raised than answers deliv-Available online http://ccforum.com/content/13/2/R33
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ered. Caregiver sample sizes are small and represent only one
model of critical care delivery (i.e. the academic medical cen-
tre); the findings are not likely to be directly extensible to other
practice models. Few units operate with more providers on
rounds. Further, there was no systematic effort in this study to
ensure a full cross-section of rounding participants. In units run
without housestaff the division of strategic and tactical think is
not relevant for separation of the cognitive planes, and rather
the focus will need to be more effective transitions between
them.
This exploratory work indicates that there is much work to be
conducted. One pressing issue is to ensure that the primary
cognitive issues are identified so that these cognitive tasks are
appropriated distributed and then adequately supported (but
not only technological support [39]). Another critical concern
is with technologies that hinder, rather than help practitioners,
due to their complexity and/or poor design. Unfortunately,
human error is all too often simply transformed, or even ampli-
fied, by technological change, and new demands are levied
which afford new ways to make mistakes. Thoughtful, well-
tested systems that effectively support clinical teamwork,
based on an understanding of the cognitive and environmental
demands of clinical teams in the ICU, is the crucial first step
toward future technology acceptance.
Conclusions
We believe we have shown that the techniques of CTA within
the framework of NDM is a useful tool to understand the criti-
cal care process of decision-making and communication. Five
broad categories of cognitive activities were seen in this anal-
ysis: pattern recognition, uncertainty management, strategic
vs. tactical thinking, team coordination and maintenance of
common ground, and creation and transfer of meaning
through stories. Deeper analysis of each activity is necessary
to properly support (e.g. with technology) and to redesign both
cognitive and physical workflows. Before offering solutions,
further investigation is crucial into each of these activities and
to the implications for team cognition and communication. The
lack of understanding and imprecision of cognitive activities is
likely to contribute to significant preventable harm.
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